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NOTES
LEAVING ROOM FOR INNOVATION:
REJECTING THE FTC's STANCE
AGAINST REVERSE PAYMENTS IN
SCHERING-PLOUGHV. FTC
INTRODUCTION

Patent infringement settlements in the Hatch-Waxman context'
have reunited the yin and yang of economic development: patent and
antitrust laws.2 The problem is deceptively simple. A pharmaceutical
company brings a patent infringement suit against a competitor who
is planning to release a generic version of one of the pharmaceutical
company's brand-name drugs. Before trial, the parties settle. As part
of the settlement, the brand-name manufacturer agrees to pay the ge-

neric competitor a large sum of money (a "reverse payment") to concede that the generic drug was infringing a valid patent underlying the
brand-name drug. Both parties are, ostensibly, better off. The brandname keeps its patent and potential for market power. The generic
receives more money from the brand-name than it would have earned
t Awarded the eleventh annual Case Western Reserve Law Review Outstanding Student
Note Award, as selected by the Volume 56 Editorial Board.
The "Hatch-Waxman context" refers to patent infringement suits brought under the
Hatch-Waxman Act, 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000), which will be explained in detail infra Part L
2 Patent and antitrust laws share a long history of conflict. See Image Technical Servs.,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1217 (9th Cir. 1997) ("At the border of intellectual
property monopolies and antitrust markets lies a field of dissonance yet to be harmonized by
statute or the Supreme Court."); see also Louis Kaplow, The Patent-AntitrustIntersection: A
Reappraisal,97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1815 (1984) ("The intersection of antitrust law and patent
policy has proved to be a source of perpetual confusion and controversy since the passage of the
Sherman Act nearly a century ago."); Aaron B. Rabinowitz, When Does a Patent Right Become
an Antitrust Wrong? Antitrust Liabilitiesfor Refusals To Deal in Patented Goods, 11 RICH. J.L.
& TECH. 2 (2005) ("Congress, the courts, and government agencies have recognized the need to
strike a reasonable balance between antitrust and patent law in determining how far a patentee
may extend his right to exclude others from the use of his patented goods." (footnote omitted)).
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by releasing its generic version. 3 A blatant, naked restraint of trade,
exclaim the critics.4 A company paying a competitor to stay out of the
market is, clearly, an antitrust violation.5
Brand-name patent holders disagree.6 A patent, they argue, grants
its owner a right to exclude others from using its invention. 7 Moreover, courts encourage parties to settle. 8 If both parties would rather
settle their case, there is no reason to rake them over the "hot coals of
antitrust litigation." 9 If both parties agree that the generic drug would
infringe a valid patent, the patent holder has the right to settle the case
and exclude the infringer. Courts presume a patent, granted by the
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to the patent holder, is valid.' 0 A
court will invalidate a patent through only "clear and convincing evidence."'" There is, therefore, little reason to doubt the validity of a
litigated patent. So long as the settlement terms do not allow the pata "reverse payment" is
ent holder to exceed the scope of the patent,
12
within the patent holder's right to exclude.

3 For a detailed explanation of a "reverse payment" settlement and the mathematics demonstrating how both parties may end up better off under the settlement compared to the release
of the generic drug, see Cristofer Leffler & Keith Leffler, Settling the Controversy over Patent
Settlements: Payments by the Patent Holder Should Be Per Se Illegal, in ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS 475, 479-80 (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
ProbabilisticPatents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 91-92 n.15 (2005).
4 See Leffler & Leffler, supra note 3, at 476; Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis of Patent
Settlements Between Rivals, ANTITRUST, Summer 2003, at 70 ("The danger to competition
inherent in patent settlements between rivals should be self-evident.").
See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972) (finding "horizontal" restraints on trade between competitors as per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act).
6 As do other commentators. E.g., Kevin McDonald, Hatch-Waxman Patent Settlements
and Antitrust: On "Probabilistic"Patent Rights and False Positives, ANTITRUST, Spring 2003,
at 68; Marc G. Schildkraut, Patent-Splitting Settlements and the Reverse Payment Fallacy, 71
ANTITRUST L. J. 1033 (2004).
7 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969) ("The
heart of his legal monopoly is the right to invoke the State's power to prevent others from utilizing his discovery without his consent."); Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co.,
210 U.S. 405, 425 (1908) ("[W]henever this court has had occasion to speak it has decided that
an inventor receives from a patent the right to exclude others from its use for the time prescribed
in the statute.").
Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2003)
("The general policy of the law is to favor the settlement of litigation, and the policy extends to
the settlement of patent infringement suits.").
9 Id. at 992.
1035 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) ("A patent shall be presumed valid.").
I Neff Instrument Corp. v. Cohu Elecs., Inc., 298 F.2d 82, 86 (9th Cir. 1961) ("This presumption is based upon the expertness of the Patent Office.").
12 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 2003)
("Unlike some kinds of agreements that are per se illegal whether engaged in by patentees or
anyone else, such as tying or price-fixing, the exclusion of infringing competition is the essence
of the patent grant.").
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The problem, however, is that only a court, during the litigation
process, can conclusively determine the scope of a patent.1 3 The
"metes and bounds" of a patent are defined with verbal boundaries,
requiring a court to interpret the claims and decide whether a competing product infringes upon its territory. Likewise, parties must rely
only on the litigation process to determine the validity of a patent. To
be sure, a patent is presumed valid. Nevertheless, there is always the
chance that a court may invalidate it. After a reverse payment, however, the parties never litigate the issues and, therefore, never thoroughly resolve them.
The critics' concerns have not persuaded the courts.1 4 The majority
of courts encountering antitrust suits over reverse payments have upheld the settlements on the basis that the antitrust plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that the settlements exceeded the scope of the underlying
patent. Unless the antitrust plaintiff can show that the patent was invalid or not infringed, and that the settling parties knew it at the time
of settlement,1 5 the courts presume that the settlement was within the6
patent holder's right to exclude others from using its invention.'
Moreover, courts generally find that the settlement does not harm
competition, because the patent holder merely retains the same patent
rights (and any market power) it held before the commencement of
litigation. 17
Those wanting to use antitrust laws to challenge reverse payment
settlements are stuck in a Catch-22. On the one hand, to show an
antitrust violation, the plaintiff must show that the settlement
exceeded the rights of the patent holder. On the other hand, one can
determine the rights of a patent holder only through a trial on the
merits of the patent, which of course, the settlement avoided. An

13 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) ("The duty of
interpreting letters-patent has been committed to the courts.") (quoting 2 W. ROBINSON, LAW OF
PATENTS § 732, at 481-83 (1890)).
14 For an extensive review, see In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation,
363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 524-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), which provides a detailed analysis of several
holdings involving reverse payment settlements. For cases upholding reverse payment settlements, see Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227 (1 1th Cir. 2005), Schering-Plough
Corp. v. FrC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc. 344
F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003), and Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986
(N.D. I1. 2003).
15 In Asahi Glass, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 993, Judge Posner suggested an "objectively baseless" standard to determine whether settling parties knew, or should have known, at the time of
settlement whether or not the patent was invalid or clearly not infringed by the generic drug.
16 Id.
17Id.; Valley Drug Co., 344 F.3d at 1309 ("If Abbott had a lawful right to exclude competitors, it is not obvious that competition was limited more than that lawful degree by paying
potential competitors for their exit.").
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antitrust plaintiff can only win by litigating the case that the parties
settled out of existence.
Necessity, of course, is the mother of invention. Critics of reverse
payments have, accordingly, presented shortcuts to resolve the issue
without requiring a trial on the merits of the patent. Some have argued
for a presumption of illegality if the settlement price exceeds the
anticipated cost of litigation.' 8 Others have argued that reverse
payments, in and of themselves, create a strong presumption that the
patent holder exceeded the scope of its patent. 19 The courts, however,
remain unmoved.2 °
This issue recently took center stage, when the Supreme Court
considered whether to grant certiorari in Schering-Plough v. FTC, a
case in which the FFC brought antitrust charges against the parties to
a reverse payment settlement. 2' In Schering-Plough,22 the FTC
charged Schering-Plough and two generic competitors with violating
the Sherman Act 23 after the parties included a reverse payment as part
of a patent infringement settlement. Schering-Plough and the generic
companies negotiated settlements in which the generic companies
could release their generic drugs at a later date (but before ScheringPlough's patent expired) and Schering-Plough paid a lump sum payment to the generic companies. 24 Although the FTC did not directly
examine the merits of the underlying patent dispute, it concluded that
the reverse payment, in and of itself, created a presumption that
Schering-Plough exceeded its patent.25 The FTC, relying on economic
models, 26 argued that Schering-Plough would not have agreed to
make the payment without getting something in return. They concluded that the settlement's quid pro quo was for Schering-Plough to
pay money to the generics in exchange for the generics agreeing to a
later entry date than they would have otherwise agreed to without the
I Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlements of Intellectual PropertyDisputes, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1719 (2003).
19Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis, supra note 4, at 72; Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent
Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391,407-08 (2003).
20 See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 531
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("There is simply no legal basis for restricting the rights of patentees to choose
their enforcement vehicle.").
21 FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
22 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1060-62 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
- 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal.").
24 Schering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1060-62.
Ia2at 1065.
26 In particular, the FTC relied on economic arguments similar to those put forth by Professor Shapiro. See Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 19, at 407-08.
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payment. The agreement, therefore, harmed consumers because it
deprived them of the potential for lower (generic) prices at an earlier
date.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the FFC's conclusions and vacated
their rulings against Schering-Plough. 27 The court maintained its insistence that plaintiffs alleging antitrust violations against settling
parties must provide evidence that the settlement did, in fact, exceed
the scope of the patent. 28 Although the FTC's inference may have
intuitive appeal, the court would not presume that the agreement exceeded the patent's scope.
The Supreme Court recently denied the FTC's petition for a writ of
certiorari,2 9 based upon the Solicitor General's recommendation.30
Although the Solicitor General recommended that the Court allow the
Eleventh Circuit's decision to stand, his brief noted that the reverse
payment controversy raises "important and complex issues concerning the antitrust treatment of settlements in patent cases, 31 but Schering-Plough did not "present an appropriate opportunity for [the] Court
to determine the proper standards for distinguishing legitimate patent
settlements. 32 In other words, the Solicitor General left the door wide
open by failing to take a position, one way or the other, on the legitimacy of reverse payments in patent settlements. Rather, the brief
merely concluded that the facts presented in Schering-Plough were
not an appropriate vehicle for determining whether courts should treat
reverse payments as presumptively illegal under the antitrust laws.
The controversy, therefore, continues.
In this Note, I examine the FTC's position that reverse payments
are presumptively illegal and conclude that its argument fails on legal
and practical grounds. I further propose that the rationale underlying
Professor Michael Carrier's "common denominator" model for resolving patent/antitrust conflicts 33 is applicable in the reverse payment
situation. Under Carrier's model, patent and antitrust laws share a
27

Schering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1076.

28 Id. at 1075-76 ("We have said before, and we say it again, that the size of the payment,

or the mere presence of a payment, should not dictate the availability of a settlement remedy.... What we must focus on is the extent to which the exclusionary effects of the agreement
fall within the scope of the patent's protection.").
29 FFC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
30 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126 S. Ct.
2929 (2006) (No. 05-273), 2006 WL 1358441.
31 Id. at 8.
32 Id.
33 Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-AntitrustParadox, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 761
(2002). Professor Carrier's article primarily addresses Sherman Act section 2 issues, in contrast
to most reverse payment scenarios, which generally involve Sherman Act section I charges.
Nevertheless, the underlying need to evaluate the impact on innovation when deciding between
antitrust enforcement and patent protection remains in the reverse payment context.
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common goal of promoting innovation (their "common denominator").34 Some industries require strong patent rights to foster innovation, when research and development is exceedingly expensive and
products are easily replicable.35 Other industries require high levels of
competition for innovation, when products are relatively inexpensive
to develop 36 and new products build upon technologies of older products. 37 The pharmaceutical industry is a quintessential example of an
industry that relies heavily on strong patent rights for innovation. 38 I,
therefore, conclude that, in the pharmaceutical industry, the presumption should rest in favor of the patent holders in order to promote innovation.
Part I provides further details about how the Hatch-Waxman Act
gave rise to the reverse payment phenomenon. Part II addresses the
main arguments for treating reverse payments as presumptively
illegal, primarily the "probabilistic patent" model, upon which the
FTC relied in Schering-Plough. Part 1I discusses the federal courts'
reasons for refusing to treat reverse payments as presumptively
illegal. Part IV provides further examination of the FTC's arguments
in Schering-Ploughand demonstrates i reliance on faulty assumptions
and their impracticability. In Part V, I propose that courts and
commentators should focus on the role of innovation when trying to
resolve the reverse payment problem and that the burden should lie on
those challenging the rights of patent holders in the Hatch-Waxman
context.
I. THE REVERSE PAYMENT PHENOMENON

A. The Hatch-Waxman Act
In 1984, Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Restoration Act, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.39
Through the Act, Congress sought to lower prices of prescription
drugs by encouraging generic drug manufacturers to challenge patented brand-name drugs and enter the market. 4°
Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic manufactures hesitated in
challenging the patents of brand-name drugs for two reasons. First, if
3

Id. at 799-816.

35 Id. at 820.
36 Id. at 821.
37 Id. at 829.
38 See id. at 824-26 (providing an overview of the high costs involved in bring a pharmaceutical product to the market).
39 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000).
40 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14-15 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2647-48.
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a generic manufacturer were to release a generic version of a patented
drug and lose a patent infringement suit, it would be liable to the
brand-name company for lost profits. Often, the damages to the patent
holder would exceed the total revenues the generic stood to make. 4'
Second, even if a generic company were to successfully challenge
the patent of a brand-name drug by winning a patent infringement
suit, the generic company's competitors (i.e., other generic manufacturers) would also benefit from the lawsuit and release their own generic versions without incurring the costs that the challenger spent on
litigation. Accordingly, a generic challenger, after losing its litigation
costs, may find itself behind other generic companies who42release
their products without incurring the additional litigation costs.
The Hatch-Waxman Act aimed to remove the obstacles preventing
generic companies from challenging brand-name patents. First, the
Act established a procedure for the brand-name company and generic
company to resolve any patent disputes before the generic releases its
version of the drug into the market. Before gaining FDA approval for
release, the generic must notify any patent holders of the brand-name
drug and certify that either no patent is infringed or that the brandname's patents are invalid.43 If a patent holder wishes to challenge the
generic drug for patent infringement, the Act creates a thirty-month
stay to the FDA approval process. During the thirty-month stay, the
parties litigate the infringement issue. 44 The issue of infringement is,
therefore, resolved before the generic company releases its drug into
the market and the patent holder does not suffer any damages in lost
profits.
Second, the Act grants a one hundred and eighty day period of
exclusive sales rights to the first generic company to successfully
challenge a brand-name drug and enter the market. 45 The successful
41 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 91-92 (explaining how patent monopoly profits
exceed potential profits for a generic entrant); McDonald, supra note 6, at 69 ("[Tlhe infringer's
profit on each sale is less than the damage the infringer will owe for that sale if the patent is
upheld.").
42 For a detailed explanation of the "public goods" phenomenon in challenging patents
through litigation, see Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives To Challengeand Defend
Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why AdministrativePatent
Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 952 (2004). See also Lemley & Shapiro,
supra note 3, at 89.
43 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i) (2000) ("An applicant that makes a certification ...shall
include in the application a statement that the applicant will give notice as required by this
subparagraph.").
Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) ("If [a patent infringement] action is brought [within 45 days], the
approval shall be made effective upon the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the
date of the receipt of the notice provided..."). Prior to the Hatch-Waxman Act, a patent holder
could hold liable a company developing a drg that infringed the patent.
I Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(1) ("[1]f the application contains a certification ...and is for a
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challenger, therefore, has a brief amount of time to recoup its
litigation costs while it shares duopoly prices with the brand-name
drug.
B. The Reverse Payment as an Inevitable By-Product
The Hatch-Waxman context forces many patent holders, facing
potentially substantial losses, to settle their infringement cases against
generic challengers. 46 In a small number of these settlements, the patent holder agrees to pay the allegedly infringing generic company to
stipulate to the validity and infringement of the patent and to delay
releasing its generic drug.47 Many have criticized these "reverse payments" or "exclusion payments," claiming the payments are nothing
more than a naked restraint of trade, as the patent holder pays a competitor to stay out of the market.48 Others have argued that reverse
payments are an inevitable by-product of the Hatch-Waxman context
and so long as the settlement does not exceed the scope of the patent
holder's right to exclude, reverse payments are acceptable.49
The following subsections explore the factors contributing to reverse payment settlements.
C. PharmaceuticalPatentStatistics
Pharmaceutical companies develop new drugs through an incredibly costly and lengthy process with no guarantee for success. Companies spend approximately $800 million in research and development
to bring a new drug to the market.50 For every five thousand potential
new drugs, only two hundred and fifty are tested in animals and only
five will make it to human testing. 51 Then, the FDA is likely to approve only one of the five drugs that make it to the human clinical

drug for which a first applicant has submitted an application containing such a certification, the
application shall be made effective on the date that is 180 days after the date of the first commercial marketing of the drug (including the commercial marketing of the listed drug) by any
first applicant.").
46 For a detailed analysis of Hatch-Waxman settlements up to 2002, see FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY (2002).
47 d at 25 (citing nine settlements in which a brand-name patent holder paid the generic
challenger).
48 E.g., Leffler & Leffler, supra note 3, at 476.
49 See Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311 ("[Ihe presence of
an exit payment as part of the settlement does not alone demonstrate that the Agreements had
obvious anticompetitive tendencies above and beyond Abbott's potential exclusionary rights
under the ...patent."); McDonald, supra note 6, at 69-70.
50 PhRMA, THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT IN PERSPECTIVE: PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
CONTEXT FOR THE FTC'S GENERIC DRUG STUDY 4, FTC File No. V000014 (June 18, 2002).
51 Id. at 15 fig.1.
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trials phase. 52 Finally, when the one drug out of five thousand potential drugs enters the market, it faces competition from other patented
drugs, in addition to the challenges from the generic companies under
Hatch-Waxman.53 Moreover, even before Congress enacted the
Hatch-Waxman Act, only one in three drugs on the market recouped
its research and development costs.54
The pharmaceutical industry is, therefore, an incredibly risky enterprise. The threat of generic entry under Hatch-Waxman, and the
subsequent loss of the brand-name's potential for market power, intensifies the risk. A patent holder would, therefore, clearly prefer to
settle a Hatch-Waxman infringement case against a generic challenger rather than face even a small risk of losing at trial.
D. BargainingPositions of the Parties
The Hatch-Waxman context also dramatically alters the bargaining
positions of the parties in the infringement suit.55 Normally, a patent
holder sues an infringer after the infringer enters the market and damages the patent holder. The patent holder can potentially hold the infringer liable for its lost profits and for treble damages.56 The patent
holder, however, also faces the risk of losing any market powers it
has if the court finds its patent invalid or noninfringed. Because both
parties face a risk of loss, they are likely to compromise, with the
alleged infringer paying the patent holder some portion of the potential damages based on the likely outcome of the trial. Alternatively,
the parties might agree to a licensing arrangement, with the royalty
structure reflecting the probability of the patent holder winning the
case. In either case, the alleged infringer admits to infringing a valid
patent and agrees not to compete directly with the patent holder.
The Hatch-Waxman context, however, places the risks solely on
the patent holder.57 Because the litigation takes place during the
thirty-month stay before the release of the generic drug, the generic
company is not at risk for any damages owed to the patent holder.
Moreover, because the generic company did not spend millions of
dollars to find the one safe and effective chemical out of five thousand candidates, its research and development costs are miniscule

52
53
54

Id.
Id. at 14.
id. at 17. Generic entry, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, therefore, makes it even less

likely that a pioneer brand-name will recoup its research and development costs.
55 McDonald, supra note 6, at 69-70.
6 Id.
57 Id.
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compared to the brand-name company's. 5 8 The generic company
stands to lose only its litigation costs and its relatively small investment in developing the generic drug. The patent holder, on the other
hand, stands to lose much more.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York recognized this dramatic shift in bargaining position in In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation59 (Cipro I). There,
the plaintiff argued that a reverse payment within a Hatch-Waxman
settlement was a per se violation of the antitrust laws. The court
noted, "Because of the Hatch-Waxman scheme, [generic company's]
exposure in the patent litigation was limited to litigation costs, but its
upside-exclusive generic sales-was immense. The patent holder,
however, has no corresponding upside, as there are no infringement
damages to collect, but has an enormous downside-losing its patent.'6° The court concluded:
[RIeverse payments are a natural by-product of the HatchWaxman process, and-even if such payments were not
contemplated or intended by the [Hatch-Waxman]
amendments-plaintiffs have not shown that they are so
nefarious in this case as to subject the challenged
agreements, which provide for such payments, to per se
treatment.61
One may disagree with the court's reasoning in Cipro I that the
mere fact that reverse payments are the by-product of Hatch-Waxman
litigation justifies their occurrence. After all, some clear antitrust violations might be the by-products of particular economic conditions.
The question then becomes whether a patent holder can circumvent
the risk asymmetry in a Hatch-Waxman infringement case and unilaterally enforce its patent rights by including a reverse payment in its
settlement with an alleged infringer.
The following section outlines the dominant arguments against reverse payments, which rely heavily on the "probabilistic" approach to
patent rights. These arguments conclude that the antitrust laws should
prohibit a patent holder from unilaterally enforcing its patent rights in
such a way that leaves the patent holder in a better position than it
58 PhRMA, supra note 50, at 4 ("It typically costs only perhaps $1 million or so for generic manufacturers to demonstrate bioequivalence, and otherwise prepare a regulatory application to [the] FDA..."). This would mean that releasing a generic version of a brand-name drug
is approximately 11800 of the cost to develop the brand-name drug.
59In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 251 (E.D.N.Y.
2003).
60
61

Id
Id. at 252.
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would have been had its infringement case gone through a complete
trial.
11. PROBABILISTIC PATENTS

The "probabilistic patent" model underlies the strongest criticism
of reverse payments in Hatch-Waxman settlements.62 Advocates of
the probabilist model ("Probabilists") stress that patent rights and
litigation are inherently uncertain and only the federal court system
can resolve the uncertainties.63 The antitrust laws, they argue, should
protect consumer welfare by prohibiting patent holders from "buying
up" certainty and extending their monopoly powers. 64 This section
outlines the Probabilist argument and illustrates why the Probabilists
oppose reverse payments in patent settlements.
A. Four Underlying Principles
Economists endorsing
the probabilistic patent model assume four
65
underlying principles:
1. Market Power
In any antitrust case using the rule of reason, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the defendant had enough market power to disrupt
competition through its behavior. 66 Although a patent does not necessarily create market power,67 the Probabilists rely on economic studies and historical market activities that show a drop in prices when
generic drugs enter the market. 68 They, therefore, assume that a patented brand-name drug has market power.

See Lemley & Shapiro, supranote 3.
Id. at 85-87; see also Leffler & Leffler, supra note 3.
64 Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 19, at 394-95.
65 See Robert Kneuper, FourEconomic PrinciplesUnderlying the FTC's PositionAgainst
Reverse Payments in Patent Settlement Agreements, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE, January 2006,
at 1.
66 See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[The] four classical, subsidiary antitrust questions: (1) What is the
specific restraint at issue? (2) What are its likely anticompetitive effects? (3) Are there offsetting
procompetitive justifications? (4) Do the parties have sufficient market power to make a
differenceT').
67 See 111.
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S.Ct. 1281, 1293 (2006) ("Congress,
the antitrust enforcement agencies, and most economists have all reached the conclusion that a
patent does not necessarily confer market power upon the patentee."); U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE
AND FTC, ANTrrRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 2.2
(1995) ("[We] will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret necessarily confers
market power upon its owner.").
68 Kneuper, supra note 65, at 2.
62
63
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In the context of reverse payments, the Probabilists argue that the
presumption of market power is even stronger. Critics of reverse
payments, Leffler and Leffier suggest that the existence of a reverse
payment is, itself, evidence of market power, because the patent
holder would have no incentive to make the payment otherwise. 69
2. Mutual Economic Incentives Between Settling Parties
The Probabilists also point out that both the patent holder and the
alleged infringer have economic incentives to delay market entry for
the generic drug. 70 The patent holder's brand-name drug will lose
more profits than the generic company stands to gain. 71 Both parties,
accordingly, are better off if the patent holder pays the generic company a sum of money that is more than what the generic company
expects to gain but is less than what the brand-name company expects
to lose.
3. Patent Rights Are Inherently Uncertain
The most prevalent criticism of reverse payments hinges on the
72
idea that patent rights are "probabilistic" in nature. 72 The PTO grants
patents at an alarmingly high rate without the resources to ensure the
validity of every issued patent.73 Moreover, the "metes and bounds"
of patents are verbally demarcated, leading to differences in interpretation. 74 These inherent weaknesses in the patent system lead to uncertainties over the true scope or validity of any given patent.
The Probabilists, therefore, argue that a patent holder does not
have a "right to exclude," but rather a "right to try to exclude by asserting the patent in court. ' 75 Any patent holder bringing an infringement suit runs the risk of a court finding its patent invalid or that the
69 Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, Efficiency Trade-Offs in Patent Litigation Settlements: Analysis Gone Astray?, 39 U.S.F. L. REv. 33, 33 n.1(2004) ("Of course, not all patents
give the patent holder market or monopoly power. This is the case when, for example, the
patented good faces many close substitutes at prices equal to its marginal costs or when there is
little or no consumer value of the patented good. This Article does not consider cases where a
patent gives no market power because in those cases there will be no gains from a payment
settlement and therefore no economic incentive to engage in such settlements.").
70 Kneuper, supra note 65, at 2.
71 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 91-92 n.15; Leffler & Leffier, supra note 3, at 47980.
72 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 75-76; Leffler & Leffler, supra note 3, at 48689; Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 19, at 395.
73 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 77-79 (discussing the rise in patent uncertainty
due to the PTO's inefficient patent application process).
74 See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 85-87 (discussing the role of language's inherent ambiguity in patent uncertainty in litigation).
75 Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 19, at 395.
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allegedly infringing activity is outside of the scope of the patent. Accordingly, the patent holder always stands the chance to lose any
market powers associated with its patent. A patent's "strength" is,
therefore, calibrated to the
patent holder's probability of winning any
76
given infringement suit.
4. The Role ofAntitrust Laws
Probabilists also assume that antitrust laws should protect
consumer welfare.77 The antitrust laws protect consumer welfare by
prohibiting restraints on trade that negatively affect allocative or
productive efficiencies. 7 Moreover, many courts have recently
narrowed the focus of the antitrust laws to protect consumers, rather
than competitors, by concentrating
on the effects of anticompetitive
79
restraints on consumer prices.
In the Hatch-Waxman context, the gains to society resulting from
lower generic drug prices are arguably larger than the losses created
by the costs of litigation. Economist Robert Kneuper has argued that
consumer welfare losses from delayed generic entry are eighty-five
times greater than the amount of expected losses from litigation.8 °
B. The Probabilists'Argument Against Reverse Payments
The critics of reverse payments rely on a fundamental premise that
patent settlements should leave consumers no worse off than what
would be expected had the parties continued through a complete trial.
Economics professor Carl Shapiro, for example, proposes that "consumers have a 'property right' to the level of competition that would
have prevailed, on average, had the two parties litigated the patent
dispute to a resolution in the courts. 8 1 Moreover, because patents are
uncertain, the federal court system (and not the patent holder acting
on its own) should resolve the uncertainties to guarantee that consumers receive the expected level of competition to which they are entitled. When a patent holder settles a claim against an alleged infringer
by using a reverse payment, the patent holder is unilaterally buying
76

Id.

77 Leffler & Leffler, supra note 3, at 476; Shapiro, supra note 19, at 70.
78

Carrier, supra note 33, at 810-11.

79 See John B. Kirkwood, Consumers, Economics, and Antitrust, in ANTITRUST LAW AND

ECONOMICS 1, 31-33 (John B. Kirkwood ed., 2004) (discussing the "primacy of consumer
interests" in antitrust enforcement policies).
80Kneuper, supra note 65, at 4. This does not, however, factor in the social losses due to
decreased innovation in the pharmaceutical industry. Rather, it balances only the gains from
more generic drugs and the losses from increased patent litigation.
81Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 19, at 396.
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up certainty and circumventing the patent laws' inherent uncertainty
at the expense of consumers. 82
The critics urge the courts to treat reverse payments as presumptively illegal violations of the antitrust laws.83 Otherwise, they argue,
parties in Hatch-Waxman suits will likely agree to delay generic entry, because both parties are economically better off with a settlement
that includes a reverse payment. 84 Moreover, because delaying a generic drug's market entry is more costly to the overall consumer welfare than patent litigation costs, courts should tilt the balance towards
protecting consumers instead of protecting an overburdened court
system.

IH. THE COURTS'

RESPONSES TO THE PROBABILISTIC MODEL

The courts have been unreceptive to the Probabilists' plea for a
presumption of illegality for settlements that include reverse
payments. 85 In only one instance, the Sixth Circuit held a reverse
payment to be a per se violation of the antitrust laws.8 6 This case,
however, is peculiar in its facts, because the parties agreed that the
generic company would refrain from releasing any version of the
drug, whether or not it infringed the brand-name's patent.87 Other
courts, however, have refused to treat reverse payment settlements as
presumptive violations and have, instead, evaluated them under a
"rule of reason" approach.8 8
To put reverse payments in perspective, we can evaluate where
these settlements fall on the spectrum that lies between those cases
that all commentators are likely to agree are unlawful and those cases
that all commentators are likely to agree are lawful. At the unlawful
end of the spectrum, all parties would agree that if a patent holder is
certain that the challenger is not infringing its patent, or that a court
Id.
See Hovenkamp et al., supra note 18; Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis, supra note 4. And for
an argument that supports a per se illegal treatment, see Leffler & Leffler, supra note 4.
84 Leffler & Leffler, supra note 4, at 479-80; Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 9192 n.15.
85 See infra note 14 (listing cases upholding reverse payment settlements).
8 La. Wholesale Drug Co. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litig.), 332 F.3d 896, 907-08 (6th Cir. 2003).
8 Id. at 902.
88 Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 429 F.3d 370
(2d Cir. 2005), amended by 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 22154 (2d Cir. 2006); Andrx Pharms., Inc.
v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litig. (Cipro 11), 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,
402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006); Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986 (N.D. ni. 2003); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms.,
Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied sub nom., Walgreen Co. v. Abbott Labs.,
543 U.S. 939 (2004).
82

83
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would certainly invalidate its patent, then the litigation would be
"sham" litigation and a violation of the antitrust laws. On the other
side of the spectrum, all parties would agree that a settlement including a licensing arrangement or a negotiated entry date would be lawful. The Probabilists argue that the market would drive the parties to
agree to terms that reflect the strength of the patent. Others, who are
not concerned with patent "strength," see the settlement as a compromise that falls within the patent holder's right to exclude or license
its patent.
Between the two poles lies a reverse payment settlement, which
may also include a licensing deal or a negotiated entry date in
addition to the lump sum payment. The Probabilists argue that
because there is no reason to believe that a reverse payment
settlement adequately reflects a patent's strength, courts should draw
the line of legality at settlements including only a licensing deal or a
negotiated entry date and presume that the parties agreed to terms that
reflect the strength of the patent. Others, as explained below, feel that
the probability of winning the patent infringement suit (outside of
sham litigation) and the expected level of competition are not factors
in the antitrust analysis. Accordingly, courts should draw the line at
the point of sham litigation in which the patent holder is excluding
competitors when it knows (or should know) that its patent does not
warrant exclusion.
A. Cipro IM
In a case commonly referred to as Cipro III, the Second Circuit
recently provided the most thorough legal analysis rejecting the
probabilist model and the "presumptively illegal" approach
championed by many critics of reverse payment settlements. 89 The
court, in Cipro III, determined whether a reverse payment, as part of a
Hatch-Waxman settlement, violated the antitrust laws.90 The antitrust
plaintiffs, relying on the probabilist model, argued that the reverse
payment was an illegal restraint of trade depriving consumers of the
chance for lower drug prices. 91 The court made the following detailed
89 Cipro111,
363 F. Supp. 2d 514. This case is commonly referred to as Cipro 111,
since it
is the third opinion generated from the same dispute.
90 Id.
91Id. at 531 ("The heart of plaintiffs' argument is that there was at least a chance that
the ...[patent] was invalid and, therefore, the Agreements violated antitrust law because the
patent rights they enforce derive from a potentially invalid patent. They argue that the potential
invalidity of the patent translates into a potential for open competition (and, hence, lower
prices), and that the possibility of realizing such open competition was unfairly foreclosed by
the Agreements.").
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conclusions rebutting the plaintiffs' claims, and by extension, the
probabilist model.92
1. No Duty To Protect ConsumerSurplus
The court first rebutted the premise that consumers have a property
right in the outcome of private lawsuits, specifically the expected
consumer surplus.9 3 The court argued that holding parties accountable
for a public interest, by threat of antitrust violations, would dissuade
parties from settling and undermine the judicial system's preference
for settlement. 94 If parties are unsure about the enforceability (and
legality) of their settlement agreements, they are more likely to opt
for a full trial, where the outcome is determinative and enforceable.
2. A Patent's "Strength" Is Impossible To Quantify
The court also argued that it is impossible for settling parties to objectively quantify the patent holder's "probability" of winning a
case. 95 The plaintiffs argued that every patent has inherent uncertainties and cited data illustrating that courts have invalidated approximately 50% of patents litigated through trial.96 The court rejected this
argument, because it "undermin[es] the presumption of validity that
Congress has afforded patents. 97 The court also concluded that the
assumptions of the probabilist model would threaten valid licensing
arrangements, because parties would worry about antitrust violations
if their royalty schemes did not correspond to the "true" probability
strength of the patent. 98
3. The Payment Amount Reflected the PatentHolder's Risk
The plaintiffs argued that the settlement was presumptively illegal,
because the payment amount exceeded the expected costs of litiga92 The plaintiffs specifically cited Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 19, as authority in
their motion for summary judgment. Id.
93 Id. ("This concept of a public property right in the outcome of private lawsuits does not
translate well into the realities of litigation, and there is no support in the law for such a right.").
94 Id. at 532 ("Requiring parties to a lawsuit either to litigate or negotiate a settlement in
the public interest, at the risk of treble damages is, as a practical matter, tantamount to establishing a rule requiring litigants 'to continue to litigate when they would prefer to settle' and 'to act
as unwilling private attorneys general and to bear the various costs and risks of litigation."'
(quoting Nestle Co. v. Chester's Market, Inc., 756 F.2d 280,284 (2d Cir.1985))).
95 Cipro 111, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
96 Id. at 532-33.
97 Id. at 533.
" Id. ("To open royalty-bearing patent license agreements to antitrust scrutiny simply because patents are often held invalid when tested in litigation would undermine the settled expectations of patentees and potential infringers/licensees across countless industries.").
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tion.99 The plaintiffs assumed that if the patent holder was willing to
pay more than its expected costs of litigation, it must have predicted
the court would find its patent invalid or not infringed. The court rejected this argument, because the $398 million payment accurately
reflected the patent holder's belief that it had a 25% chance of losing
the case.1°° That is, the payment amount equaled 25% of the patent
holder's expected lost profits if it were to lose the trial. Whether or
not the payment exceeded the expected costs of litigation was irrelevant. If courts were to use the "expected cost of litigation" as a
benchmark for presuming a settlement as illegal, then it would force
all patent holders to avoid settlement, because in generally all cases,
the patents holders' expected loss of profits exceeds their costs of
litigation.
4. The Payment Is Not Evidence of a Quid Pro Quo To Delay Entry
The court rejected the argument that reverse payments are evidence of a quid pro quo for the parties to agree to delay generic entry
to the detriment of consumers.1l ' Relying on arguments put forth by
Professor Shapiro, 0 2 the plaintiffs concluded that without the reverse
payment, the two parties would have settled on an earlier entry date
for the generic drug. 103 The patent holder, they argued, used the payment to entice the generic company to release its drug at later a date,
effectively sharing the brand-name's monopoly profits at the expense
of the consumers. 1°4 The court rejected the notion that the parties
would have otherwise agreed to another (earlier) entry date without
the reverse payment: "The problem with this argument is that, due to
the disparity between the brand-name manufacturer's and generic
challenger's expected profits, there might not be any date that represents a reasonable litigation compromise for early (pre-patent expiration) entry by the generic challenger."' 0 5
The court continued to attack the plaintiffs' quid pro quo argument
on the grounds that there is no law requiring parties to agree to the
"most competitive" arrangement. 1°6 In dismissing this "better settlement" argument, the court relied on the Supreme Court's recent hold99Id.
100Id. at 533-34.
101Id.at 535-36.
102Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 19.
I03
Cipro I11,
363 F. Supp. 2d at 535-36.
104
ld.at 536.
0

'1 Id.

1061d. ("[flf defendants were within their rights (more specifically, the patent right) in
reaching the settlement they did, consumers have no right to second-guess whether some different agreement would have been more palatable.").
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ing in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V.
Trinko, LLP,' °7 in which the Court stated: 'The Sherman Act... does
not give judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its way
of doing business whenever some other approach might yield greater
competition. ,,108 Accordingly, even if the patent holder did make a
reverse payment in order to entice the generic to delay entry, there is
no legal duty to garner the most competitive settlement, so long as
both parties are settling within their rights (i.e., within the scope of
the patent)."19
B. Schering-Plough and Scope of Patent
Despite the federal courts' refusal to treat reverse payment settlements as presumptively illegal, the Federal Trade Commission recently adopted its own stance. In Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC,"i 0
the FTC relied on the Probabilists' quid pro quo argument in bringing
antitrust charges against parties involved in a Hatch-Waxman reverse
payment settlement. The settlement involved Schering-Plough, owner
of the patent for K-Dur,' and two generic manufacturers, ESI and
Upsher-Smith, who were petitioning the FDA for the release of their
generic versions of K-Dur under the Hatch-Waxman Act. In their
settlement agreement, the parties agreed to allow both generic drugs
to enter prior to the expiration of Schering-Plough's patent. The parties also agreed to reverse payments." 2 The FTC charged Schering-

107540 U.S. 398 (2004).
108Id at 415-16.

1

09Cipro 111,
363 F. Supp. 2d at 536 ("[Defendants] cannot be penalized just because plaintiffs can imagine a more pro-competitive settlement, if the agreement they did reach does not
adversely affect competition beyond the scope of the.. . [platent.").
110402 F.3d 1056 (1 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
111Describing K-Dur 20, the court stated that:
[K-Dur 20 is] an extended-release microencapsulated potassium chloride product ...which is a supplement generally taken in conjunction with prescription
medicines for the treatment of high blood pressure or congestive heart disease. The
active ingredient in K-Dur 20, potassium chloride, is commonly used and unpatentable. Schering-Plough, however, owns a formulation patent on the extendedrelease coating, which surrounds the potassium chloride in K-Dur 20 ....
Id. at 112
1058.
Upsher and Schering-Plough dispute whether or not Schering-Plough actually paid Upsher a reverse payment. Schering-Plough paid Upsher $60 million for the licensing rights to
market one of Upsher's products, Niacor-SR. Id. at 1060. The parties argued to the FTC that the
licensing deal was ancillary to the settlement agreement and within the normal range of similar
licensing arrangements. The FTC disagreed and treated the payment as consideration for Upsher
to stay out of the market with its generic version of K-Dur. Id. at 1061-62. For the purposes of
this Note, I will treat the payment as if it were a reverse payment. As for the ESI settlement,
Schering-Plough paid ESI $5 million to settle the case and agreed to pay an additional $10
million if the FDA approved ESI's generic drug. Id. at 1060-61.
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Plough, Upsher, 13and ESI with violations of the Sherman Act and the
Commerce Act.'
At trial, the administrative law judge (AU) dismissed the charges
against the parties, claiming the FTC's complaint counsel presented
no evidence that the settlement exceeded the exclusionary scope of
Schering-Plough's patent. 1 4 Moreover, the AU determined that
Schering-Plough did not possess a monopoly in the relevant potassium chloride supplement market and was sensitive to competitive
15
prices from other potassium chloride supplements in the market.'
The Commission, however, reversed the AU's dismissal and
found that the parties violated the antitrust laws.1 16 The Commission,
relying on the arguments put forth by economists and critics of reverse payments, found that "it is logical to conclude that the quid pro
quo for the payment was an agreement by the generic to defer entry
beyond the date that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation
compromise."' 17
The Federal Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit set aside
and vacated the Commission's decision, 118 agreeing with the ALJ that
the FTC's complaint counsel provided no acceptable evidence that the
settlement exceeded the exclusionary scope of Schering-Plough's
patent. 1 9 The FFC petitioned for, but was denied, an en banc review. 20 The Supreme Court also recently denied the FTC's petition to
hear the case. 121

1131d. at 1061.
114Id
151d. at 1061-62. The AU, in its initial decision, reported that there were 23 potassium
chloride supplements in the market, which were therapeutically similar and treated as interchangeable within the market. In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2002 WL 1488085,
I 33-59 (F.T.C. June 27, 2002) (initial decision). The AU further determined that K-Dur
competed with other substantially similar potassium chloride supplements in the market and was
sensitive to competitive prices. Id. 9H 60-113. For example, K-Dur was not the highest priced
potassium chloride supplement in the market and Schering-Plough offered customers rebates on
purchases of K-Dur, suggesting it was competing with other products. 1d. ft 111-17. None of
these factors support the FTC Commission's opinion that Schering-Plough had significant
market power in the market for potassium chloride supplements.
116 Schering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1062.
11 n re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, WL 22989651 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003) (final order) (citing as support Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 19, and Hovenkamp et al.,
supra
note 18).
I 8 Schering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1076.
190 1ld. at 1068-72.
12 Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11 th Cir. 2005), rehearingand rehearing en banc denied, 147 Fed.App'x 156 (11 th Cir. 2005) (unreported table decision).
121
FrC v. Schering-Plough Corp., 126 S.Ct. 2929 (2006).
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1. The Commission'sDecision
In its decision to overturn the AL's findings, the FTC Commission did not evaluate Schering-Plough's market power. Instead, it
relied on the Indiana Federation of Dentists exception that allows
antitrust plaintiffs to avoid market power inquiries if they can show
that the challenged conduct created a direct negative effect on the
market. 22 The Commission concluded that because generic entry
normally lowers prices, an agreement to restrict generic entry necessarily has a direct effect on the market.123 The Commission, therefore,
ignored the ALJ's detailed factual findings on K-Dur's market power
and its price sensitivity to the twenty-three other potassium chloride
products, which24included other generics, on the market at the time of
the settlement.'
Under the FTC's rule of reason analysis, once it showed the
settlement's anticompetitive effects, the burden shifted to the settling
1 25
parties to demonstrate pro-competitive reasons for their agreement.
The defendants proposed theoretical pro-competitive justifications for
reverse payments, such as the need for the brand-name manufacturer
to pay a "cash strapped" generic manufacturer in order to help it stay
in business long enough to release its generic drug on the future
negotiated entry date. 126 The Commission, however, found that
neither of the generic companies was, in fact, cash strapped, and
refused to accept any theoretical justifications for reverse payments
not grounded in fact.1 27 Reverse payments, according to the
Commission's opinion, are presumptively illegal 28 and require a
22

1 Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1065. ("Since the purpose of the inquiries into market
definition and market power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on competition, 'proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of
output,' can obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a 'surrogate for
detrimental
effects."' (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986))).
23
1 See In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, WL 22989651, 9116-20 (F.T.C. Dec. 8,
2003) (final order).
24
1 See In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2002 WL 1488085, V 8-20 (F.T.C. June
27, 2002) (initial decision) (providing an extensive review of the market data showing that
Schering-Plough's K-Dur was part of a competitive market).
125In re Schering-Plough, Corp., No. 9297, WL 22989651, IN 36-39 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003)
(final order).
126Id. The defendant's argument was that a generic manufacturer may go out of business
before the agreed upon entry date, so the reverse payment is necessary to keep it in business.
Hence, in this sense, the reverse payment is pro-competitive since it ensures that the generic
company is around long enough to release its drug and increase competition. See Sumanth
Addanki, Schering-Plough and the Antitrust Analysis of Patent Settlement Agreements in PharmaceuticalMarkets, ANTrrRUST INSIGHTS, Spring 2005, at 1 (explaining the position that Addanki put forth in his expert testimony for the defendants).
17In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, WL 22989651, IN 16-20 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003)
(final order).
12 rhe Commission carefully avoids treating reverse payments as per se illegal. Id 1 14. It
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factual showing demonstrating pro-competitive benefits stemming
from such payments.1 29 Absent any actual pro-competitive showings,
the FTC treats reverse
payments as anticompetitive and a violation of
1 30
the antitrust laws.
2. The Eleventh Circuit'sReview
In reviewing the Commission's decision on appeal, the Federal
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit conceded that the agreement was likely to create less competition than would have occurred
if the generic drugs had entered the market earlier. 131 The court, citing
a previous decision, 132 noted, "[a]lthough we acknowledged in Valley
Drug that an agreement to allocate markets is 'clearly anticompetitive,' resulting in reduced competition, increased prices, and a diminished output, we nonetheless reversed for a rather simple reason: one
of the parties owned a patent." 133 The court, therefore, relied on its
previous ruling in Valley Drug and determined that neither the per se
approach nor the rule of reason approach applied in antitrust cases
involving reverse payment settlements.1M In rejecting both approaches, the court pointed out that patents, by their very nature, already "create ' 135
an environment of exclusion, and consequently, cripple
competition."
The court, accordingly, set forth a specific three step test for
evaluating the antitrust implications of patent settlements. The court
stated that, "the proper analysis of antitrust liability requires an
examination of: (1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the
patent; (2) the extent to which the agreements exceed that scope; and
(3) the resulting anticompetitive effects., 136 The court's analysis
acknowledged the inherently anticompetitive effects of patents and
requires an antitrust plaintiff to demonstrate that the alleged
anticompetitive behavior exceeded
the permissible exclusionary
137
restraints embodied in the patent.

nevertheless puts the burden on the defendant to proffer pro-competitive justifications, supported 29by factual showings.
1 1d. 39.
130Id.

131Scheing-Plough Corp. v. FrC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1066 (11 th Cir. 2005).
132Valley

Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11 th Cir. 2003).
F.3d at 1064.
134Id. at 1065.
135Id. at 1065-66.
36
' Id. at 1066.
37
1 The court concluded that its test reached "[a] suitable accommodation between antitrust
law's free competition requirement and the patent regime's incentive system." Id. at 1075 (quoting Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1307).
133Schering-Plough,402
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The court decided that, based on the evidence presented, neither of
Schering-Plough's settlements exceeded the exclusionary scope of its
patent. 138 Moreover, the court expressly rejected the FTC's quid pro
quo argument that the existence of a reverse payment necessarily implies that the parties agreed "to defer [the] entry date beyond the date
that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise."' 139 As
the Second Circuit concluded in Cipro 1ff,140 the Eleventh Circuit
found no reason to assume that the parties would have reached any
other agreement 14 ' without the reverse payment, considering the
asymmetries of risk between the parties. 42 The court further concluded that a bar on any settlements including consideration from the
patent holder to the alleged infringer would effectively chill all settlements, because settlements, by 43their nature, require each party to
give something to the other party.
The Eleventh Circuit's rule placed the burden back on the FTC.
Under the court's rule, the FTC can no longer presume a reverse
payment settlement harms competition. Instead, an antitrust plaintiff,
such as the FTC, must first demonstrate that the settlement in question exceeded the exclusionary scope of the underlying patent and
harmed competition to a greater degree than the patent permitted.
Moreover, the court's use of the phrase "exclusionary potential" suggests an objective standard of "reasonableness," where the settlement
does not have to fall within the strict, absolute confines of the patent.
Rather, the settlement must fall into what the parties reasonably believed to be the patent's potential for exclusion. In more recent decisions involving reverse payments, 144 federal courts have applied the
"objectively baseless" standard borrowed from Professional Real
Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Industries., Inc.145 Hence,
Schering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1072.
1391d. at 1073 (quoting In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, WL 22989651 (F.T.C.
Dec. 8, 2003) (final order)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
138

140
See

supra note 104.

Such as a compromised entry date for the generic drug.
42
1 Schering-Plough,402 F.3d at 1073-74.
43Id. at 1074. The court cited Judge Posner's opinion in Asahi Glass in its reasoning: "[if]
any settlement agreement can be characterized as involving 'compensation' to the defendant,
who would not settle unless he had something to show for the settlement. If any settlement
agreement is thus to be classified as involving a forbidden 'reverse payment,' we shall have no
more patent settlements." Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 2d 986, 991
(N.D. 111. 2003) (emphasis omitted).
'"Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 429 F.3d 370
(2d Cir. 2005), amended by 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 22154 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Asahi Glass, 289
F. Supp. 2d at 993 (applying the "objectively baseless" test to defendants' settlement
agreement).
145508 U.S. 49, 60 (1993) (defining an objectively baseless lawsuit as one in which "no
reasonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits").
141
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not only must an antitrust plaintiff show that a settlement agreement
exceeded the patent's scope, the plaintiff must also show that "no
reasonable litigant" would have expected the patent holder to win the
underlying patent infringement case.
IV. EVALUATING THE EFTC's POSITION

In its petition to the Supreme Court, the FTC remained steadfast in
its belief that reverse payments should be presumptively illegal. The
FTC argued that the Eleventh Circuit's ruling provided the exact opposite standard, making it presumptively legal for a patent holder to
pay competitors to stay out of the market.146 This section will provide
an overview and criticism of the FTC's arguments for treating a reverse payment as presumptively illegal, ultimately concluding that the
FTC's approach is neither legally, factually, nor practically valid.
A. The Role of Patent Uncertainty
The following subsections evaluate the FTC's first argument that
criticizes a patent holder's ability to use its patent-unilaterally,
without a court resolution-to exclude potential competitors.
1. Excluding Potential Competitors
The FTC first argued that antitrust laws prohibit companies from
excluding competitors even when they are uncertain whether the
competitor will enter the market. 147 The FTC cited cases in which
courts held parties liable for entering into agreements that kept potential competitors out of the market. 148 These cases, however, are inapposite to the Hatch-Waxman scenario, because they were not patent
cases nor did they involve patent holders exercising their rights to
exclude competitors. It comes as little surprise that a company that
does not possess any exclusionary rights cannot contract with a potential competitor to stay out the market, even if the competitor's entry is
uncertain. The FTC's argument, however, obfuscated the issue by
equating an agreement not to compete with an exercise of one's exclusionary rights under a patent.
146Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 12, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 05-273
(1 th Cir. Aug. 29, 2005), 2005 WL 2105243 (claiming that the Eleventh Circuit's ruling makes
it so that "a patentee is presumptively entitled to buy protection from all competition for the full
patent term, even if such payments effectively augment the patent's actual exclusionary
power").
47
1 1d. at 15.
4
1 81d. (citing Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1990) (per curiam);
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
34, 79 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
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2. The Inherent Weakness of Patents
The FTC continued by arguing that the inherent uncertainties of
patent litigation should prohibit patent holders from using settlements
to unilaterally exclude potential infringers. In order to demonstrate
the general "weakness" of patents, the FTC referred to an oft-cited
Allison and Lemley study that found that courts invalidated approximately 46% of all patents challenged through litigation. 149 Many other
commentators and critics of reverse payments have used the Allison
and Lemley article and similar studies to highlight the ostensibly
weak nature of patent rights. For example, Abbott and Michel claim:
As a matter of probabilities ... it is clearly inappropriate to
simply assume that a patentee could exclude a competitor
from the market simply because he asserts that to be the case.
Informed antitrust analysis will acknowledge this fact and
recognize that exclusion payments cannot be justified on the
basis of the patentee's unproven assertion of its right to
exclude. 150
Likewise, the Public Patent Foundation, in its amicus brief to the Supreme Court in support of the FTC's petition, wrote:
Since roughly half of all asserted patents end up having no
exclusionary power whatsoever, it was improper for the Court
of Appeals to assume that Schering' s patent would have complete exclusionary power with respect to all generic products
throughout its full term. Such an assumption was no more
justified than assuming the patent 151
will have no exclusionary
power with respect to any product.
These commentators are not-so-tacitly implying that reverse payments should be presumptively illegal, because it is unlikely that a
patent holder could withstand any challenge in court. Or, at the very
least, a patent holder is just as likely to lose as it is to win. A court
49

1 Id. at 17 (citing John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, EmpiricalEvidence on the Validity

of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205-206 (1998)). Some argue that the PTO's inefficient procedures in granting patents leads to general uncertainty over whether a given patent is
in fact valid. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3.
15 Alden F. Abbott & Suzanne T. Michel, The Right Balance of Competition Policy and
Intellectual Property Law: A Perspective on Settlements of PharmaceuticalPatent Litigation,
46 IDEA 1, 12 (2005).
151Motion of the Public Patent Foundation for Leave to File Brief as Anmicus Curiae and
Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 05-273
(1 th Cir. Sept. 30, 2005), 2005 WL 2454837.
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should, therefore, be reluctant to allow a patent holder to assert its
right to exclude competitors.
These statements denigrating the strength of patents suffer from
the logical fallacy of selection bias. The arguments rely only on cases
that parties litigate through completion, which are unreliable data. In
fact, it would be impossible to collect reliable data. Empirical methods require a random sampling of population groups. '2 Patent infringement cases that are litigated to completion are not a random
sampling of patents. 53 First, some patents may have certain factors
that increase the likelihood that they will be challenged. Second, litigants settle the overwhelming majority of patent cases before trial.' 54
Patent cases that are litigated through a complete trial are, therefore,
likely to be non-representative of all patent cases.
Moreover, those relying on the Allison and Lemley data often
155
overlook the fact that the authors broke the data into product types.
Pharmaceutical patents withstood validity challenges in over 72% of
the sampled trials. 56 Even if the data could provide reliable inferences on the general "probabilities" of patents, 157 the Allison and
Lemley data show that pharmaceuticalpatents, the patents underlying
the Hatch-Waxman settlement controversy, have more than a mere
fifty-fifty chance at excluding any competing product. In fact, the
high success rate for pharmaceutical patent holders would be consistent with the patent laws' "clear and convincing" standard to invalidate a patent.
Nevertheless, the FTC continued to make similarly overreaching
statements by alluding to other data collected in its own 2002
study. 58 The FTC, in its petition, claims that "the percentage of vulnerable patent claims appears to be even greater in the HatchWaxman context,"1 59 because "generics prevailed in cases involving
52

1 See RICHARD P. RUNYON ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BEHAVIORAL STATISTICS 18, 341
(9th ed. 2000) (explaining the necessity of random selection in empirical studies).

153 See Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases-An Empirical Peek Inside
the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REv. 365, 374-75 (2000) ("Most scholars agree... that the small
percentage of all legal disputes that reach trial is not a representative or random sampling of all
cases.").
154Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 75 ("[O]nly 1.5 percent of patents are ever litigated,
and only 0.1 percent of patents... are ever litigated to trial.").
155Allison & Lemley, supra note 149, at 199 (noting that the data were broken into groups
of patents for mechanical, electrical, chemical, pharmaceutical, biotechnology, computerrelated, or software).
1561d. at 217 thl.5.
1S7 Which

it cannot, due to the study's selection bias.

158FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION:

AN FTC STUDY 19-20 (2002).
159Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 17, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 05-273
(11 th Cir. Aug. 29, 2005), 2005 WL 2105243.
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73 percent of the challenged drug products."'1 60 The FTC, however,
failed to mention that in its own report, it broke data into patent validity and patent infringement cases. In the trials adjudicating patent
validity, the patent holders prevailed 72% of the time.' 61 Hence, in the
vast majority of cases in which the generic drug companies prevailed,
they prevailed due to non-infringement. Because patent infringement
is a case-specific issue that does not reflect the strength of patents in
general, the data collected from infringement cases do not create an
inference that pharmaceutical
patents are generally weak and unlikely
162
challenge.
to withstand
Professors Landes and Posner offer data on patent validity that
also belie the FTC and others' misconstruction of general patent
strength. The authors showed a remarkable increase in patent validity
holdings since the inception of the Federal Circuit. 163 Immediately
before the Federal Circuit, courts held patents as valid in approximately 45% of the cases. 164 The percentage has steadily increased to
around the 65-70% range per year. 165 As Landes and Posner demonstrated in a series of66statistical studies, the Federal Circuit has been
strongly pro-patent. 1
The FTC overstates its claims about the general weakness of patents. Similar claims of "substantial uncertainty" that arise "when patents are litigated, ' 167 are not supported when one scrutinizes the
available data. In fact, in the pharmaceutical context, the data show
that a court is probably going to uphold the validity of a challenged
patent. To suggest that the antitrust laws should prohibit a patent
holder from exercising its rights to exclude, based upon the purported
findings of "substantial uncertainty" surrounding patent validity, is
obscuring the data and drawing misleading conclusions. The Supreme
160Id. at5.
161The FTC found that in only 28% of the drug products that went to trial, the patent
holder lost the trial due to an invalid patent (11/40). FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note
158, at 20. The FTC even admits that its validity findings are consistent with the Allison and
Lemley findings for pharmaceutical patents. Id. at 20 n.15. Nonetheless, the FTC neglected to
mention this fact in its petition to the Supreme Court.
162Moreover, one must not forget that these data are generally irrelevant to the ScheringPlough case, since many of the cases in the FTC study that reached a final resolution settled
(20/53) and the cases that went through complete trials are unlikely to be representative statistical samples of patents as a population.
63

1 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 338-39 (2003).
1641d. at338 tbl. 12.1.
165 Id.

1661d. at 334-53; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study
in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 25-30 (1989) (evaluating the criticism that the
Federal67Circuit demonstrates a greater pro-patent bias than the regional circuits).
1 Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 3, at 80.

2006]

REJECTING FTC'S STANCE AGAINST REVERSE PAYMENTS

249

Court should, accordingly, disregard the FTC and others' attempts to
persuade it that patent holders are using reverse payments to hide
behind generally "weak" patents.
B. Preservingthe Expected Level of Competition
The FIPC continued by arguing that a patent's "strength' ' 168 should
dictate the terms of the settlement agreement. That is, the settlement
terms should ensure that consumers enjoy the expected level of
competition had the parties resolved the issue through a complete
trial. The FTC argued that reverse payments allow patent holders to
garner a better settlement deal than their patents would have
otherwise provided:
[I]f the parties simply compromise on an entry date prior to
the patent's expiration, without cash payments, the resulting
settlement presumably would reflect the parties' own
assessment of the strength of the patent .... If, however, the
patent holder makes a substantial payment to the challenger
as part of the deal, absent proof of other offsetting
consideration, it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo
for the payment was an agreement by the generic to defer
entry beyond the date that
represents an otherwise reasonable
169
litigation compromise.
The FTC, relying on the probabilistic model, argued that parties
should not agree to terms depriving consumers of their chance for
possible competition. 170 Instead, the parties should agree to terms that
adequately reflect the level of competition that otherwise would have
occurred had the case gone through a complete trial.17' Licensing
deals or negotiated generic entry dates would reflect the parties' collective assessment of the patent's strength. Reverse payments, on the
other hand, allow the patent holder to buy certainty and deprive consumers of the level of competition that otherwise would have occurred under other settlement schemes.

6

18 Meaning, the probability of the patent holder's success at trial. See Shapiro, Antitrust

Limits,69supra note 19, at 395.
1 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, FTC v. Schering-Plough Corp., No. 05-273
(11 th Cir. Aug. 29, 2005), 2005 WL 2105243 (internal quotations omitted).
17OId.
71

1 Id. at 19 ("Where a patent holder makes a payment to a challenger in order to induce it
to agree to a later entry than it would otherwise agree to, consumers are harmed eitherbecause a
settlement with an earlier entry date might have been reached, or because continuation of the
litigation without settlement would yield a greater prospect of competition.").
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The FfC's "otherwise would have occurred" argument is the central tenet of the probabilistic model. For example, Leffler and Leffler
argued that because Congress made patents presumptively valid
rather than conclusively valid, then every patent has a chance to be
found invalid. 72 Moreover, by making patents merely presumptively
valid, Congress intended to encourage competitors to challenge patents through the legal process.1 73 The Lefflers conclude that patent
holders who pay alleged infringers to settle are circumventing the
patent laws and depriving
consumers of competition that otherwise
174
would have occurred.
Notwithstanding the fact that settling parties have no legal duty to
agree to terms that provide consumers with the most competition, 75
the "otherwise would have occurred" argument fails for several practical reasons, as discussed in the following subsections.
1. The Difficulty in Determiningthe Patent's "Strength"
Patent litigation results are binary, not continuous. A patent holder
either wins, and is able to continue excluding the challenger, or loses,
and must allow the challenger to compete. The level of competition
176
that otherwise would have occurred is, therefore, either all or none.
Understandably, the Probabilists ground their arguments in averages, i.e., competition that would occur in the aggregate. As Shapiro
argues:
[A] patent settlement between rivals cannot lead to lower expected consumer surplus than would have arisen from ongoing litigation. Effectively, antitrust gives consumers the right
to the level of competition that would have prevailed, on average, had the two parties
litigated the patent dispute to a
177
resolution in the Courts.
This approach, however, conveniently confuses two separate forms of
probability. When a patent holder decides that it has a 75% chance of
winning at trial, it uses a subjective probability or "betting odds" that
have no mathematical or statistical verifiability. The Probabilists,
7

& Leffler, supra note 3, at 487; see also Keith Leffler & Cristofer Leffler, The
ProbabilisticNature of Patent Rights: In Response to Kevin McDonald, ANTIrRUST, Summer
2003, at 77.
73
Leffler & Leffler, supra note 3, at 487.
1 1Leffler

74

1

Id.

175 See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 531-32
(E.D.N.Y.
2005).
76
1

"n

See McDonald, supra note 6, at 74.
Shapiro, Antitrust Limits, supra note 19, at 70 (emphasis added).
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however, conveniently treat this 75% probability as if it were a frequency-based probability; if the patent holder tried its case in an infi78
nite amount of universes, it would have prevailed in 75% of them.
By couching a patent holder's subjective probability in frequencybased probability terms, the Probabilists create the illusion that there
is some objective and measurable (and, therefore, protectable) amount
of competition that would have happened had the patent holder and
the alleged infringer completed the trial.
One might argue that the two parties converge on the "real" probability through negotiation and compromise.179 Accordingly, there is
no need to consider an objective and measurable mathematical probability. The standard model of settlement, however, assumes that both
parties substantially agree on the strength of the patent, or the patent
holder's likelihood of success at trial.1 80 As previously discussed, the
assumption that both parties will converge on a "substantial agreement" over the patent's strength is diminished in the Hatch-Waxman
context. The alleged infringer has not damaged the patent holder, nor
has it sunk much cost into developing its generic. The alleged infringer has no constraints pushing it to a (reasonable) negotiable position. It is, therefore, difficult (if not impossible) to determine the
"true" probability of the patent, because81the parties are unlikely to
come to a mutually agreed upon number.1
The Probabilists respond by saying "so be it." Congress enacted
the Hatch-Waxman Act as part of the patent laws, so patent holders
must accept their fate and accept the risk of having a patent that is
vulnerable to such challenges. 82 A patent holder with a pharmaceutical patent runs the risk of having to negotiate to a lower figure than it
would have absent the Hatch-Waxman Act. A reverse payment, however, circumvents the balance and enforcement structure established
by Congress and inherently extends the scope of the patent. Presuma178See Charles M. Yablon, The Meaning of Probability Judgments: An Essay on the Use
and Misuse of Behavioral Economics, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 899, 906-20 (2005) (providing a
comprehensive review of the different types of probability and their legal applications).
179See Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis, supra note 4, at 72 ("We may reasonably infer that the
terms of the settlement, e.g., the royalty rate paid or field-of-use restrictions applied, reflect the
assessments of the parties regarding their prospects in the patent litigation.").
180See Yablon, supra note 178, at 959 ("The standard economic model of settlement states
that cases will settle whenever both parties to the litigation substantially agree as to the expected
value of the claim.").
181In licensing negotiations, outside of litigation, the licensor and licensee are still likely to
agree to the patent's "strength," since the licensee would either gain no money, because the deal
would not be made, or would face heavy infringement liability if it decided to release its own
product without the license. In either case, the licensee has a reason to reach an agreement with
the licensor about the patent's strength. In a Hatch-Waxman suit, there is much less incentive
for the82alleged infringer to agree to the patent holder's assessment of its patent strength.
1 See Leffler & Leffler, supra note 3, at 490-92.
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bly, this means that in the likely event that the parties are unable to
agree to the "strength" of the patent, the parties must continue on with
the litigation.
But the argument overlooks the fact that Congress has structured
the federal court system, the means of enforcing one's patent rights,
by passing laws to encourage settlement and manage judicial efficiency. 183 We are, therefore, left to assume that when Congress directed patent holders to the federal courts in order to enforce patent
disputes, it also directed them to the underlying settlement provisions,
as well. To say that reverse payments are outside of the federally prescribed enforcement structure and, therefore, illegal, simply assumes
its own conclusion. There is, however, no evidence that the settlement
laws explicitly bar reverse payments. 184 One cannot say that reverse
payments break the rules of enforcing patents when there is no rule
against reverse payments. Whether there should be a rule against reverse payments is precisely the issue at hand. We cannot assume that
reverse payments lay outside of the scope of the settlement laws (a
subset of the patent enforcement structure), just to conclude that reverse payments are illegal.
When a patent holder uses the federal court system, and its underlying settlement provisions, in a Hatch-Waxman suit, there is no
guarantee that it and the alleged infringer will reach a mutual assessment of the patent's "strength." Forcing patent holder's to lower their
negotiating positions will lead more of them to choose trial over settlement. A law that prohibits reverse payments to resolve an impasse,
especially when both parties are sure that the patent holder is more
likely than not going to win (and therefore continue excluding the
challenger), will waste judicial resources. Moreover, the level of
competition that "otherwise would have occurred" is lost in the ether
of subjective probability because the parties cannot come to a mutual
conclusion.

183 See Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 471 et seq. (1991) ("There shall be implemented by each United States district court, in accordance with this chapter, a civil justice
expense and delay reduction plan. The plan may be a plan developed by such district court or a
model plan developed by the Judicial Conference of the United States. The purposes of each
plan are to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery,
improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil
disputes."). This law is precisely the reason the judge forced the parties in Schering-Plough into
including the reverse payment.
settlement,
4
'8 Although Congress amended the Hatch-Waxman Act in 2003 and knew about the reverse payment phenomenon, it did not create an outright ban of reverse payments.
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2. The Problem of Multiple Challengers
Even if both parties agree to a patent's "strength," we encounter
another problem if we are to assume that settlements must protect the
level of competition that otherwise would have occurred had the parties continued through trial. If a court invalidates a patent in one case,
the patent holder can no longer use that patent to exclude others.' 85 A
finding of patent invalidity effectively puts the underlying invention
into the public domain. This creates a problem for assessing a patent's
strength when there are multiple challengers, as in Schering-Plough.
Suppose a patent holder has four competitors who are all independently, but simultaneously, challenging its patent's validity. Because the patent's strength as per validity will remain constant, the
patent holder will face each challenger with an equal probability of
success. Let us suppose all parties agree that the patent's strength is
75%. The strength of 75%, however, only applies to each individual
trial (i.e., for each trial, the patent holder has a 75% chance of winning and a 25% chance of losing), Yet, if we were to calculate the
patent holder's chances of winning all four trials, the patent's
"strength" falls to 32%:
Probability of winning all 4 trials = 0.75 * 0.75 * 0.75 * 0.75
= 0.316
Even if only two competitors were challenging the patent, its
"strength" would fall to 56%:
Probability of winning both trials = 0.75 * 0.75 = 0.562
If we are to define a patent's strength by its ability to withstand
challenge through litigation, on average,'86 it becomes more difficult
to assess its strength when it faces multiple challengers, as ScheringPlough did when it faced challenges from both Upshaw and ESI.
More importantly, if a patent holder has a duty to protect the expected
consumer surplus by negotiating a settlement that adequately reflects
the patent's strength,187 multiple challengers make it more difficult to
185 See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of 111.Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50 (1971)
(allowing patent infringement defendants to assert a collateral estoppel defense against a plaintiff whose patent had previously been found invalid).
8
1 6 Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis, supra note 4, at 70. Admittedly this argument treats subjective probabilities as frequency-based probabilities. But this is precisely how the Probabilists use
the term probability when discussing its relation to the expected consumer surplus as they speak
of the level of competition that would happen on average.
187Again, Shapiro argues that consumers have a right to the level of competition that
would have occurred with a complete resolution at trial. Id. The argument implies that consumers have the same right to the level of competition that would have occurred if all trials from all
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determine the level of expected surplus. What is the level of
competition that "otherwise would have occurred" had each of the
trials posed in the above hypothetical been completed through
litigation? (1-0.75)? Or (1-0.32)?
If the courts adhere to an "otherwise would have occurred" policy
when evaluating patent infringement settlements, they will run into
the messy problem of combined probabilities. A patent with a 75%
chance of winning any given challenge stands only a 32% chance of
winning a combination of four independent challenges. Hence, a
"strong" patent has become a "weak" patent through nothing more
than an over-reliance on thinking of patents in probabilistic terms.
3. The Alleged Infringer'sIncentive To Infringe and Hold Out
Another pragmatic problem with the "otherwise would have occurred" standard can best be described through a hypothetical: A
company uses a competitor's patent to create an exact copy of the
underlying product. The company makes no attempt to invent around
the claims of the patent, and readily admits that it copied the patent's
product as is. The patent holder sues the company for infringement.
During settlement negotiations, the "alleged" infringer admits to infringing the patent and concedes to its validity. Both parties agree that
the patent holder has a remarkably strong chance of prevailing at trial.
The patent holder demands that the infringer stop wasting both parties' time and discontinue its infringing activity. The patent holder
offers no payment, no licensing deal, no compromised entry date, or
anything else to the infringer. The infringer agrees that the case is a
waste of time and would like to walk away, but it cannot. Why? Because if the infringer admitted defeat and walked away, it would have
violated the antitrust laws. After all, every patent has at least some
probability of having a court invalidate it. Hence, there was a chance,
albeit a small one, that the court would have invalidated the patent. If
the parties settled, without a licensing deal or a negotiated entry date
for the infringer, they would have robbed the consumers of the small
expected increase in competition that otherwise would have occurred
had the parties continued through trial.
This extreme, absurd result illustrates another problem with the
"otherwise would have occurred" argument. The rule encourages

challengers were resolved in court. If a patent holder negotiates a deal reflecting a patent
strength of 75% with all four challengers, then it is depriving consumers of a level of expected
competition that would have occurred if all four trials were completed (a difference of 43%
(75%-32%)).
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patent infringement, because competitors would be enticed by the fact
that patent holders must accept that their patents may be invalidated
and negotiate a deal that adequately reflects the chance of that
happening.
One might quibble with the absurdity of the example and claim
that nobody is arguing that the alleged infringer should not be allowed
to simply walk away without receiving anything. But consider the
same set of facts, except the infringer refuses to walk away without
some sort of deal. The patent holder has the statutorily prescribed
right to refuse to license its product to the infringer. 188 Yet, if both
parties agree that the patent holder has a 99% chance of winning and
the expected lost profits, if litigated to judgment, are $10 million (1%
of expected profits after a win), the FTC's position prohibits the patent holder from paying the infringer $10 million to go away, and
forces it into a licensing deal or a negotiated entry date for the infringing product. 89 The only other alternative is for the parties to continue
with the trial. We, therefore, have two parties, who both anticipate
that the patent holder will decisively win, wasting the court's time
and resources simply because the patent holder cannot pay the infringer to admit defeat and walk away.
Of course, in the Hatch-Waxman context, the parties' negotiation
positions are reversed. Typically, the defendant makes an offer to the
plaintiff that approximates the plaintiffs damages discounted by the
probability of the defendant winning the case. In a Hatch-Waxman
suit, however, the defendant generic company has not yet damaged
the plaintiff patent holder and has nothing to lose other than litigation
costs. The generic company, therefore, has no reason not to hold out
and force the plaintiff to make an unrealistic offer. The generic would
know that the patent holder must offer it a licensing deal or run the
risk of losing its patent in court.' 90
C. Settlements Without Reverse Payments Do Not
Necessarily Preserve the Expected Level of Competition
The final pragmatic problem with the FTC's approach is that there
is no guarantee that settlements without reverse payments will, in
1

8See U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2000) ("No patent owner... shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of his
having ... refused to license or use any rights to the patent.").
'89The Probabilists may argue that this is precisely what should happen. The market
should force patent holders into deals that adequately reflect the strength of their patents. But
this completely undermines the patent holders' right to refuse licensing their products.
190In fact, this may be why more Hatch-Waxman infringement cases are litigated through
trial than what would be expected in general patent infringement cases.
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fact, promote more competition. As Professor Bulow illustrates, certain licensing arrangements generate the same effect as a reverse
payment, such as when the royalties per unit increase over quantities
sold. 191 The licensee receives an ostensible discount in royalties for
the first batch of products it sells. This discount effectively amounts
to a payment to the licensee.
In Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp.,192 Judge Posner also
noted how licensing agreements do not necessarily mean savings to
consumers:
There would then be more manufacturers . than there are
today, but there would not be more competition if the "competitors" were constrained by the terms of the patent license
to charge the monopoly price. And they would be. As a rational profit-maximizer [patentee] would charge its licensees
a royalty designed to extract from them all the monopoly
profits that the patent made possible; and the licensees would
raise their prices to consumers to cover the royalty expense.
The price to the consumer would be the
same as it is, today,
1 93
with... only [one] seller in the market.
The Probabilists argue that the parties will negotiate a deal in
which the royalty rate reflects the "strength" of the patent, or the
probability that the patent holder would win in court. 94 The parties,
however, could arrange for the licensee to pay a higher royalty rate in
return for a "hidden" payment in the form of a discount on royalties at
the beginning of the arrangement. 95 The licensee will, thus, increase
its prices, by agreement, and the patent holder will reward it by granting a lower royalty rate in the first phase of the deal. The consumers,
however, never see a lower price at any stage of the deal. Likewise,
the parties could assign the licensee a region, such as outside of the
United States, which would have little, if any, effect on the U.S. market prices.
Short of stepping in and reviewing all licensing arrangements so
that settlement parties adequately reflect the expected consumer surplus, 196 there is no way for the courts to ensure that their licensing
191Jeremy Bulow, The Gaming of PharmaceuticalPatents, in INNOVATION POLICY AND
THE ECONOMY 145, 145-87 (Adam B. Jaffe et al., eds., vol. 4 2004).
M9
752 F.2d 261, 267 (7th Cir. 1984).
193Id. at 267.

194Shapiro, Antitrust Analysis, supra note 4, at 72.
195The price the licensee charges consumers remains constant in order to reap the benefit
of the initial royalty discount (i.e., the hidden payment).
9 Which is, in itself, impossible to calculate.
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deals produce better consumer welfare than reverse payments coupled
with negotiated early entry dates.
The FrC's approach requiring settling parties to preserve the level
of competition that otherwise would have occurred had a court resolved the case is, therefore, untenable for several practical reasons.
Treating reverse payments as presumptively illegal assumes that parties would have otherwise come to a mutual agreement on the patent's
strength, which is not always likely in the Hatch-Waxman context. It
also suffers from mathematical indeterminacy, especially if more than
one competitor is challenging a patent. It encourages patent infringement and hold outs, because generic companies, who already have
disproportionate leverage, can force patent holders into licensing
agreements, against the patent holder's right to refuse to deal. Likewise, banning reverse payments does not necessarily protect any expected consumer surplus, because patent holders can hide payments
in favorable licensing arrangements with generic companies.
Although the FTC's arguments fail for various reasons, there still
remains the question of whether allowing patent holders to use reverse payments to settle infringement suits is good policy. In the next
section, I propose reasons for allowing stronger patent protection in
the Hatch-Waxman context at the possible expense of competition.
V. THE ROLE OF INNOVATION IN THE HATCH-WAXMAN CONTEXT
The reverse payment problem requires courts to balance three policy goals: a) encouraging innovation through the patent laws, b) keeping consumer prices at a competitive level through antitrust laws, and
c) encouraging settlement to lower public costs to courts and private
costs to the litigants. The trade-off between long-term economic gains
and short-term economic efficiency lies at the heart of balancing patent and antitrust laws. 197 If the courts adopt a presumptively illegal
standard for reverse payments, they will shift the balance away from
long-term gains through innovation, and towards short-term gains
through a more efficient allocation of resources. In this last section, I
propose that courts and commentators should avoid narrowly focus98
ing only on short-term efficiency losses in patent settlements.
Leffler & Leffler, supra note 3, at 485.
198Leffler and Leffler suggest that we should presume that Congress has already struck the
optimal balance between long-term and short-term efficiencies. Id. at 486. They argue that
reverse payments should be per se illegal, since they are not part of the optimal system Congress
established for patent enforcement. As noted above, this argument assumes its own conclusion,
since it assumes that reverse payment settlements are not part of the patent enforcement structure, despite the fact that the very courts upon which the Lefflers' system relies explicitly state
otherwise.
197
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Rather, the focus should be on whether short-term or long-term efficiencies deserve more protection in the pharmaceutical context.
In his 2002 article, Professor Carrier took on the difficult task of
resolving the recurring conflicts between patent and antitrust laws. 199
Carrier proposed a model that focuses on what he considers the
"common denominator" of both the patent and antitrust laws: innovation. 200 This section will explore the inherent conflicts between patent
and antitrust laws as well as the common denominator of innovation
underlying the seemingly contradictory laws. Then, the last part of
this section argues that patent protection should trump antitrust protection in the Hatch-Waxman context.
A. The Conflict Between Antitrust and PatentLaws
Patent and antitrust laws have a longstanding inherent conflict.
While both purport to enhance social welfare, they do so through often conflicting laws.2 °'
Patent laws protect an inventor from free-riding competitors by
granting it a right to exclude others from using its invention.20 2 The
temporary right to exclude provides time for the inventor to recoup
the costs of invention, thereby providing
an incentive for investment
20 3
in developing new technologies.
Antitrust laws, on the other hand, aim to enhance social welfare by
prohibiting restraints on competition. 20 4 The underlying assumption is
that competition produces lower prices, higher output, and more innovation. Antitrust laws, therefore, prohibit unreasonable restraints on
price and output.
The conflict is obvious. Patent laws promote long-term consumer
welfare by allowing patent owners to control output, and thus prices,
and reap the benefits of their innovations. 20 5 Antitrust laws promote
short-term consumer welfare by precluding activities that aim to control output and harm consumers through higher prices. 2°6 As Professor
Carrier explains,

199Carrier, supra note 33.
200Id. at 764.
201ld. at 766.
2
mSee 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2000 & Supp. 2003).
203
Carrer, supra note 33, at 767.
24Id. at 768.
2
05 Patent laws also require the patent holder to reveal the secrets of its invention, thereby
promoting progress as others may build off the patented invention. See LANDES & POSNER,
supra note 163, at 294-300 (discussing the economic logic of patent law).
2w6See ROGER D. BLAIR & DAvtD L. KASERMAN, ANTrrRUST ECONOMICS 25-45 (1985)
(providing a review of the economics supporting antitrust laws).
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In interpreting antitrust law, courts have focused primarily on
static efficiency-in other words, on increasing economic
welfare through a reallocation of the existing supply of resources in a Pareto-optimal fashion (i.e., so that no individual's welfare could be improved by a resource reallocation
without some other person's welfare being diminished). In
particular, courts analyze allocative efficiency, striving for an
optimal allocation of goods and services to customers. Patent
law, on the other hand, attempts to increase dynamic efficiency, or the Pareto-optimal allocation of resources between
the present and the future. The incentives underlying the patent system apply in the long term through the encouragement
of future invention and innovation. Although courts that have
analyzed the patent-antitrust intersection have not focused
explicitly on the tradeoffs between static and dynamic efficiency, the disparate temporal perspectives provided by the
distinct notions of
efficiency further underscore the patent20 7
antitrust conflict.
B. Innovation as the Common Denominator
Professor Carrier attempts to resolve the inherent conflict between
patent and antitrust laws by focusing on their common goal of promoting innovation. °8 Patent laws promote innovation by rewarding
inventors with the possibility of reaping financial rewards through
temporary market powers. 209 Antitrust laws promote innovation by
increasing competition between firms, who will then invest in innovative technologies to gain a competitive edge.2 10
With innovation as the common goal for both patent and antitrust
laws, Professor Carrier proposes that when patent protections square
off with antitrust protections, courts and lawmakers should determine
whether patent protection or competition is more likely to foster
innovation within the industry in question.2 11 Industries require more
patent protection than antitrust protection to generate innovation
20

7 Carrier, supra note 33, at 770-71.
28

Id. at 799-803.
09LANDES & POSNER, supra note 163, at 294-300.
See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 206, at 41-45 (discussing the traditional view of
how competition can foster innovation, as well as some of its criticisms); see also Kenneth J.
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND
DIRECrON OF INVENTIvE ACTIVrrY 609-25 (1962) (providing an economic account for how
competition promotes innovation). But see Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969) (finding that the incentive to invent is greater under a
monopoly than competition).
211Carrier, supra note 33, at 815.
2

210
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when their products have high development costs and are easy to
replicate. 1 2 On the other hand, industries with lower development
costs and technologies that build off each other generate more
innovation through competition than patent protection.2 13 When
courts and lawmakers balance the conflicts between patent protection
and antitrust enforcement, they should consider the industry's source
of innovation.
C. Stronger PatentProtectionfor IndustriesDependent on Patents
The pharmaceutical industry typifies an industry that relies more
on patent protections than competition to foster innovation.1 4 The
cost of development is extraordinarily high, as discussed in Part I.
Likewise, the end products, pharmaceuticals, are easy to replicate. 1 5
The Hatch-Waxman Act, which permits generics to bypass the
lengthy and expensive FDA requirements for safety and efficiency
tests, makes it even easier for a competitor to avoid development
costs and replicate a pharmaceutical product. 16 These factors indicate
that the pharmaceutical industry relies heavily on patents for innovation, while increased competition, at the expense of patent protection,
would likely do little to foster innovation.
D. BalancingInnovation with Allocation Efficiencies
As courts and commentators struggle with the appropriate balance
between patent protection and antitrust protection in the HatchWaxman context, they should focus on the role of innovation. As
Carrier notes, "The consensus among economists since [Joseph]
Schumpeter is that the gains achieved from innovative efficiencies
dwarf those derived from maximizing allocative efficiency and that
innovation is the most important factor in the growth of the economy. '2 17 If innovation is the economy's primary goal, the balance
212

Id. at 815-16.

2I31d.
214

d. at 824-25 ("[In the case of] pharmaceuticals ...the cost of searching for the next
breakthrough can be prohibitive. Biopharmaceutical companies often spend hundreds of millions of dollars and take ten to fourteen years to bring new drugs to market. These companies
must pass through multiple stages of innovation, such as discovering the relevant molecules
with therapeutic effects, undertaking thorough clinical testing, undergoing significant FDA
review, and developing, manufacturing, and marketing the drug. Only one out of every four
thousand discovered compounds tested in industry laboratories passes through each of the stages
and reaches
the marketplace.").
2 15
d.at 827-29.
216Especially considering patent laws require the patentee to disclose its invention.
21
7Carrier, supra note 33, at 813 (citing Joseph A. Schumpeter, CAPrrALISM, SOCIALISM,
AND DEMOCRAcY (3d ed. 1950)).
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should favor policies that will foster and protect innovation. In the
case of pharmaceuticals, patent laws should trump antitrust laws.
The competition promoted under the Hatch-Waxman Act does
nothing to promote innovation. In fact, precisely the opposite is true.
The Hatch-Waxman provisions for generic drug entry are solely concerned with maximizing allocative efficiency by increasing output
and lowering prices. Generic bioequivalents, by definition, are replicas of existing products and do nothing to promote new discoveries.
Not only does the Hatch-Waxman Act do nothing to promote
innovation, it may actually have a negative effect. Brand-name
manufactures may lose investors who doubt the company's ability to
recoup its fixed costs of research and development. Lower investment
in research and development means fewer discoveries. 218 In fact,
Hughes and colleagues compared the consumer welfare gains from
increasing allocative efficiencies to the consumer welfare losses from
diminishing research and development. 219 They found that for every
dollar saved by increasing access to generic drugs, consumers lose
three dollars in health benefits due to losses in future innovation.220
Accordingly, an overzealous push for increasing competition through
generic entry may eventually hurt consumers more than it helps.
Admittedly, if we presume that Congress struck the optimal balance between short-term and long-term tradeoffs with its patent laws,
we must accept that the balance includes the Hatch-Waxman Act's
bias towards short-term efficiencies. That does not, however, mean
that we should accept that Congress meant to tip the balance so far
away from patent protection as to force patent holders to protect the
expected consumer surplus level through their settlements. Considering that the Hatch-Waxman Act provides generic challengers incentives to hold out to unreasonable degrees, there must be a check in
place that keeps the balance from tipping too far towards short-term
gains. Reverse payments, apparently, have become that check.

21

8 Pharmaceutical companies may also turn away from patent protection, where disclosure
is required, to more trade secret protection in order to gain a competitive advantage to protect its
research and development costs.
219 James W. Hughes, Michael J. Moore & Edward A. Snyder, Napsterizing Pharmaceuticals: Access, Innovation, and Consumer Welfare 28 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 9229, 2002) ("Thus, our analysis indicates that, while the static gains in consumer
surplus are substantial, they are dwarfed by the dynamic losses in consumer surplus that would
result from Napsterizing [i.e. an extreme scenario where patent protection is eliminated]. Comparing this figure to the static welfare gain of $850 billion, the marginal benefit/marginal cost
ratio for maintaining the status quo, conditional on our assumptions, is approximately 3 to .").
220/Id.
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As the court in Cipro III noted,22 ' there are market factors that also
put a check on reverse payments. If a patent is inherently weak and
encourages generic competitors, the patent holder is less likely to
offer reverse payments because it would only encourage more competitors to challenge the patent and seek reverse payments. A patent
holder is likely to settle with reverse payments only when it believes
it has something worth protecting.
In addition, a ban on reverse payments may backfire and tip the
balance away from generic entry. If courts adopt a presumptively
illegal approach to reverse payments, more patent holders are likely to
protect their inventions by litigating through a complete trial. When a
patent holder wins a trial, it can continue excluding the challenger for
the remaining life of the patent. Because reverse payments are often
combined with negotiated entry dates, 222 if patent holders resolve
their cases through complete litigation, consumers will miss out on
the chances for earlier generic entry that might have occurred had the
parties settled.2 23 A patent holder would still, however, have a net
loss, because it had to bear its litigation costs. A ban on reverse payments would, therefore, deprive patent holders of some of the benefits
of their innovation without providing comparable gains to the consumer surplus.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court decided to let the Eleventh Circuit's decision
stand without making any formal decision on the legality of reverse
payments in patent infringement settlements. The Court, however,
based its denial of certiorari on the Solicitor General's opinion that
the facts in Schering-Plough were inappropriate to adequately address
221In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Utig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 534-35
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("[W]hile the strategy of paying off a generic company to drop its patent
challenge would work to exclude that particular competitor from the market, it would have no
effect on other challengers of the patent, whose incentive to mount a challenge would also grow
commensurately with the chance that the patent would be held invalid . . . Moreover, it is
unlikely that the holder of a weak patent could stave off all possible challengers with exclusion
payments because the economics simply would not justify it.... It could, therefore, be expected
that the market would correct for any bolstering of flagrantly invalid patents by way of exclusion payments.").
222Such was the case in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1059-61 (11th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2929 (2006).
223
See Michael A. O'Shea, Which School Are You in? Reverse Payments: The Patent
School Versus the Antitrust School, PATENT WORLD, Dec. 2005/Jan. 2006, at 29 (arguing that
banning reverse payments may chill settlements and deprive consumers of competition that may
have occurred under settlement); see also Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F.
Supp. 2d 986, 994 (N.D. IM.2003) ("A ban on reverse-payment settlements would reduce the
incentive to challenge patents by reducing the challenger's settlement options should he be sued
for infringement, and so might well be thought anticompetitive.").
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the complex issue of reverse payment settlements. The Court's decision, therefore, does not resolve the issue and leaves the door open for
other legal challenges to reverse payments.
Reverse payments are intuitively suspect given our general
aversion to a company paying competitors to stay out of the market.
This intuitive aversion must be tempered, however, by a respect for
patent laws. Patents, in essence, permit patentees to temporarily
circumvent the antitrust laws. The critical issue becomes whether or
not the patent holder excludes more competition than the patent
allows. Against the general position taken by the federal courts, the
FTC would like to place the burden on the patent holder to show that
it is justified in making a reverse payment to exclude an alleged
infringer. The FTC's position, however, is grounded in unfounded
assumptions about the general strength of patents and the ability for
settling parties to reach an agreement that maintains an immeasurable
level of "expected" competition. Moreover, the FTC's approach
myopically focuses only on short-term gains, while ignoring the
arguably more important role of patent rights in promoting innovation
in the pharmaceutical industry.
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